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C ertainly, one should always take a positive stance with respect to any practical and workable proposal aimed at increasing the protections 
afforded the civilian population in time of anned conflict. Despite that premise, 
which is basic to any consideration of the law of anned conflict, or perhaps 
because of the restrictive adjectives "practical and workable" which have been, 
and must be, used, it appears necessary to cast a negative vote with respect to a 
well-intentioned, but impractical, proposal first made by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations in 1969 and gready elaborated upon by him in 1970. 
On December 19, 1968, by Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the General Assembly 
of the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to study and prepare a 
report on the subject of "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict." He 
did so, his staff producing AI7720, November 20, 1969 (hereinafter referred to 
as the "1969 Report"). On December 16, 1969, by Resolution 2597 (XXIV), 
the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his study and 
to submit a further report on the same subject. Once again he did so, his staff 
producing A/8052, September 18, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the "1970 
Report"). 
In the 1969 Report eight paragraphs (145-52) were devoted to the subject 
of "civilian refuges or sanctuaries." In March, 1970, during the course of a Panel 
which included the United Nations official actually responsible for the 
preparation of that Report-the Director of Human Rights Division of the 
United Nations Secretariat, the present writer, in passing, ~uestioned the 
practicality of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries. This adverse 
comment, which really did not rise to the category of criticism, may well have 
inadvertendy contributed to the fact that the 1970 Report expanded the 
coverage on the subject from eight to forty-three paragraphs (45-87). It is the 
purpose of this paper to demonstrate the impracticality of the proposal for such 
civilian sanctuaries and the actual lack of need for such a device if there is 
compliance with already well-established nonns of the law of anned conflict, 
perhaps amplified in the light of currendy available and foreseeable methods of 
conducting such conflict. 
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Some discussion in depth of the proposal contained in the two Reports is 
essential for an understanding of the problem. The basic proposal was originally 
advanced in the following language: 
The difficulties which are attendant on arriving at a practically useful definition 
of what constitutes a legitimate military objective have led to the consideration 
of other solutions which might effectively increase the protection afforded to 
civilians in anned conflicts. One method might be to gather and place under 
shelter as large a part of the civilian population as possible, especially women, 
children, the elderly, the sick and those who do not participate in the armed 
conflict, nor contribute in any way to the pursuit of military operations. This 
might be achieved by adopting and developing, on a larger scale than provided at 
present, a system of safety zones which would offer special protection and even 
. . fr k 2 munumty om attac . 
The purpose of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries was 
subsequendy more clearly drawn when the 1970 Report stated: 
The civilian sanctuaries would therefore be established to draw the attention 
of the belligerents to the presence in a given area of persons whom they are already 
obligated to respect, protect or refrain from injuring. In effect, refuges or 
sanctuaries might assist in facilitating the observance by the belligerents of the 
obligations incumbent upon them.3 
Both of the Reports recognized the need for numerous safeguards in order 
to ensure the successful operation of the civilian sanctuaries and to prevent their 
misuse. These safeguards were gathered together into the following four 
propositions: 
1. The necessity for the designation and recognition of civilian sanctuaries in 
peacetime before hostilities have aroused animosity and suspicion; 4 
2. Restrictions on the selection and use of such sanctuaries;5 
3. Special identification markings for the sanctuaries and the personnel serving 
in them; 6 and 
4. A system of control and verification.7 
It appears to the present writer that the mere enumeration of these few 
requirements, which is far from exhaustive, demonstrates the lack of feasibility 
of the proposal. 
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The idea of civilian sanctuaries did not emerge full-blown from the 
Secretary-General's brow.8 It is not even the application of existing ideas and 
norms to a totally new concept. It is merely the elaboration and extension of an 
existing system of protection, which was designed for comparatively small groups 
of individuals and for comparatively small areas of real estate, to potentially very 
large segments of the population and potentially enormous portions of the land 
mass of a belligerent nation. As the 1969 ,Report points out,9 the doctrine of 
the "open city," which has been elsewhere defined as "an undefended city, open 
to occupation by enemy forces· without harm to the inhabitants,,,lO originated 
in the customary law of war and was codified in the Fourth Hague Convention 
of 1907 Y Thus, the entry of the Germans into Paris in June, 1940, during 
World War II, has been termed "a classical example of the application of the 
[1907] Hague Rules of Land Warfare.,,12 During that same War, the "open 
city" doctrine failed to provide protection to the civilian populations in the cases 
of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubliana in 1941 and in the case of Rome in 1943.13 
Three very small neutralized zones were apparendy established in Jerusalem in 
1948, but these probably did not result from an application of the "open city" 
d . 14 octnne. 
Elaborating on earlier Geneva Conventions, each of the four 1949 
Conventions provides for protected areas of one character or another: hospital 
15· f 16 rali d 17 d· 18 zones; pnsoner 0 war camps; neut ze zones; an mternment camps. 
The 1954 Hague Convention19 contains provisions setting up an elaborate 
system for the protection of areas containing cultural monuments. And, finally, 
the so-called Drqft Rules disseminated by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross in 195620 have a number of provisions on the subject of sanctuaries. 
In summary, various types of protected zones for different categories of 
noncombatants, emerging from the "open city" doctrine, have existed for a 
considerable period of time. All of these protected zones have been restricted 
to comparatively small land areas, perhaps a few thousand square yards or meters, 
at most a few square miles or kilometers, intended to afford protection to a city 
and its civilian population, to a hospital, its patients, and staff, to a prisoner of 
war or internment camp and its inmates, to a museum and its attendants. The 
Secretary-General's proposal would gready enlarge this concept. It proposes 
protected zones on a grand scale: not thousands of square yards or meters, but 
thousands and hundreds of thousands of square miles or kilometers; not the 
noncombatant personnel of a hospital, or of an internment camp, or of a 
museum, or even of a city, but a very large part of the population of the nations 
engaged in hostilities?1 Laudable and idealistic as the proposal obviously is, it 
unfortunately appears to be completely impractical in the world in which we 
live. 
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The problems involved in obtaining acceptance of and in implementing the 
proposal appear to this writer to be insurmountable. Can anyone believe that 
today's nations and their governments could reach agreement, even in 
peacetime, either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis, exempting large 
portions of their respective territories from all types of attack in the event of 
war?22 Can anyone believe that such nations would remove from, and prohibit 
the subsequent introduction into, the zones so designated of every ~e of 
industry and activity which could in any way contribute to a war effort? Can 
anyone believe that in this age of nuclear weapons and "quick" wars, a nation 
would, at the outset of hostilities, be in a position to devote the necessary energy, 
manpower, and equipment to the task of moving millions of its civilians into 
the neutralized zones?24 Can anyone believe that nations at war would be in a 
position to devote the necessary energy, manpower, and equipment to the task 
of providing logistic support for millions of its citizens who would necessarily 
be nonproductive insofar as the war effort is concerned?25 Can anyone believe 
that, human nature being what it is, the worker who stays on his job in sUfPort 
of the war effort can be successfully separated from his wife and children?2 Can 
anyone believe that any nation at war will voluntarily and actually deprive itself 
of an urgently needed resource by moving into a neutralized zone a great mass 
of potential labor, even though it be women, children, and the elderly?27 Can 
anyone believe that today's nations will accept "a system of control and 
verification" in the persons of foreign observers stationed within their territory 
in time of war?28 Can anyone believe that the huge areas involved, the 
impossibility of really effective control and verification, and the pressures of 
wartime requirements, would not result in massive evasions of the restrictions 
and improper usage of the neutralized zones?29 Can anyone believe that the 
nations of today would accept any such proposal without an escape clause such 
as the "imperative military necessity" clause of the 1949 Geneva Conventions?30 
Can anyone believe that a nuclear nation, envisioning the eventuality of defeat, 
would not use the neutralized zones as a basis for blackmail? These are but a few 
of the many questions raised by the Secretary-General's proposal, to each and 
every one of which this writer would give a negative answer. 
Is there an alternative to the Secretary-General's proposal for large-scale 
civilian sanctuaries for the protection of the civilian population? There most 
certainly is, and it is not only more feasible, but it is much more likely to be 
acceptable to the community of nations. That alternative is as follows: 
First, full-scale application of and compliance with the already existing 
restrictions on allowable military objectives, modernized as necessary to meet 
present-day requirements. What is needed is not new norms, but compliance 
with existing norms. For example, target-area bombing certainly violated the 
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principle of the military objective, but it was used by both sides so generally 
during World War II that the principle practically ceased to exist. It must be 
revived. Again, and perhaps somewhat peripherally, the Protecting Power is 
already available to do all that the Secretary-General would have a 
Commissioner-General or Observer-General do during time of actual 
hostilities-but in not one of the scores of hostilities which have occurred since 
the end of World War II has this extremely valuable international institution 
been called into action. 
Second, the law of air warfare, if any now exists, should be elaborated upon 
and codified31 The extreme reluctance of nations to establish recognized and 
accepted international rules in this very vital area is really incredible. For 
example, all governments express horror at the mere suggestion that any other 
nation, then engaged in hostilities, has resorted to "terror bombing"-the 
bombing of nonmilitary objectives and of the civilian population in order to 
destroy enemy morale and to bring an adversary to its knees on the home front 
when it has not been possible to do so on the batdefront. The 1923 Hague Rules 
of Air Warfare32 and the ICRC's 1956 Draft Rules specifically proposed such 
a prohibition,33 but many years later that proposal is still in limbo. Here, too, 
World War II practices have, unfortunately, probably negated the principle of 
the military objective. 
TI/ird, the initiation of some system of effective sanctions against belligerents 
who violate the principle of the military objective. Such a system of sanctions 
has been drafted and accepted with respect to individual violators of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions?4 There is no reason why some such system cannot be 
devised for nation violators as well as individual violators of the principle of the 
military objective, once that principle has been resurrected. 
In summary, it is suggested that the existing law of armed conflict, elaborated 
as may be necessary, particularly in the area of air warfare, if complied with (and 
with additional methods to be established for enforcing compliance), can provide 
the civilian population with the protection which it requires and to which it is 
already entided under existing norms; and that it can do this much more readily 
than can the elaborate and impractical proposal advanced by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations in his 1969 and 1970 Reports on 
"Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict. ,,35 
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